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Abstract
Manufacturers of field programmable gate arrays
(FPGAs) take different technological and architectural
approaches that directly affect radiation performance. Similar
technological and architectural features are used in related
technologies such as programmable substrates and quick-turn
application specific integrated circuits (ASICs). After
analyzing current technologies and architectures and their
radiation-effects implications, this paper includes extensive
test data quantifying various devices' total dose and single
event susceptibilities, including performance degradation
effects and temporary or permanent re-configuration faults.
Test results will concentrate on recent technologies being used
in space flight electronic systems and those being developed
for use in the near term.
This paper will provide the first extensive study of
various configuration memories used in programmable
devices. Radiation performance limits and their impacts will
be discussed for each design. In addition, the interplay
between device scaling, process, bias voltage, design, and
architecture will be explored. Lastly, areas of ongoing
research will be discussed.
I. INTRODUCTION
FPGAs are becoming increasingly popular with
spacecraft electronic designers as they fill a critical niche
between discrete logic devices and expensive, long-lead time
mask programmed gate arrays. The devices are inherently
flexible to meet multiple requirements and offers significant
cost and schedule advantages. Architecturally, the choice of
type of storage for the configuration information drives
radiation performance as in the commercial/military world it
drives key functional features and performance. Radiation
performance is influenced by other architectural features also,
including such desirable features as programmable output
slew rate, input delay selection, increased I/O module
functionality, tri-state busses, global controls, etc. The
granularity choices and details of the specific implementation
of logic functions are also important. Additionally, the choice
of fabrication technology affects total dose and single event
latchup performance while determining die size, operating
speeds, and power dissipation. The diversity of FPGA
technologies and architectures make evaluating the radiation
effects complex at both the device and system level.
The flexibility and advantages of FPGAs are being
applied to other electronic devices. For instance, a
programmable routing network can be used to create quick-
turn Multi-Chip Module (MCM) substrates; fully fabricated
routing networks can be used to implement quick-turn ASICs
where the FPGA programming resources are replaced by a
simple single mask etch.
This paper will analyze and present radiation data on the
radiation effects on current programmable technologies with
an emphasis on the most recent technologies. The analysis
will discuss the effects and complex interaction of FPGA
architecture, design, process, scaling, voltage and circuit
design. Tables provide a quick reference to the performance
of modern programmable technologies. A listing of the
devices and their manufacturers is included in Appendix I.
II. DEVICE CATEGORIES
FPGAs have 2,000 to 20,000 (or more) gates and fit
between the PAL/PLA's and the mask programmable gate
arrays. Performance is moderately good, and they are
extremely flexible as most logic structures may be easily
implemented and are also user programmable. Like most
standard commercial or military devices, radiation
performance is a matter of luck since only one device series,
the RH1280 and the RHI020, is currently intentionally
radiation-hardened for total dose. This seri_s was derived
from Actel's commercial products, the AI280XL and the
A1020B with modifications to the antifuses and isolation
transistors to enhance radiation performance. Recently, Chip
Express has introduced a new type of device between FPGAs
and mask programmable ASICs. This is based on laser cutting
of metal interconnects in the laser programmable gate array
(LPGA) or by a one-mask etch. Both of these operations are
done quickly at the factory and do not require that die and
wafers be processed at the foundry. By building only a
routing network constructed with metal routing structures and
metal to metal amorphous silicon antifuses, Pico Systems has
developed a quick turn MCM capability. Another
programmable logic device is the PROM; currently these are
implemented using either polysilicon or nichrome fuses or
antifuses; Lockheed-Martin's device uses an Actel ONO
antifuse design and UTMC's uses an amorphous silicon
antifuse. While PROMs will not be directly addressed in this
paper, their antifuse structures will be. PALs also are
designed with a variety of configuration elements. Of
particular interest to the spaceflight community is the UTMC
UT22VPI0; this radiation-hardened device is built with a
metal to metal amorphous silicon antifuse. These
technologies all contribute to the quick design and build of
small, low-cost, low-volume spaceflight electronic systems.
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FPGAs can be divided into two broad classes based on
the configuration mechanism, either reconfigurable or one-
time programmable. The configuration memory controls
function, routing, features, timing, I/O drive, etc. The
reconfigurable devices subdivide into volatile SRAM-based
and non-volatile with EEPROM cells. A hybrid class also
exists where EEPROM is used to store the configuration
information and loaded into SRAM when reset.
Reconfigurable devices may be partially reprogrammed while
running in some instances, such as Atmel's AT6000 or Xilinx'
XC6200 series. The one-time programmable devices use
antifuses; the antifuses are implemented in either amorphous
silicon or an ONO structure.
The class of circuits available to the user also
differentiates FPGA implementations. These include:
programmable output slew rates to control ground bounce,
input delay selection to optimize for on-chip delays or t_ times
at device input pipeline registers, simple I/O buffers vs.
complex I/O cells with latches, flip-flops, multiplexors, etc.,
JTAG 1149.1 Test Access Port (TAP) controller and
compliant I/O cells, internal tri-state busses vs. multiplexor-
based solutions, on-chip oscillators, phase-lock loops in the
I/O cells, internal RAM for user FIFOs, storage, and lookup
tables (LUT), etc. Each manufacturer includes different
features, variable within families optimized for different end
uses, and the radiation effects of many of these architectures
can be heavily dependent on the configuration technology, as
discussed in the next section.
It is worth noting that FPGAs have the usual commercial
off the shelf (COTS)-related problems of constantly changing
designs, processes, and foundries. Experimental results show
that radiation performance can be quite sensitive to these
changes.
HI. RADIATION PERFORMANCE
A. CONFIGURATION TECHNOLOGIES
The configuration technology of a programmable device
drives its architecture, performance, and features. For space-
based application, it is also one of the key factors in a device's
radiation performance and is a major part of this study.
I) Oxide Nitride Oxide (ONO) Antifi, ses
To date Actel makes one time programmable FPGAs with
a dielectric antifuse (with the SRAM-based System
Programmable Gate Array, 'SPGA,' having been announced).
The basic construction of the Oxide-Nitride-Oxide (ONO)
antifuse and its characteristics is shown in Figure I. The
radiation characteristics of this antifuse have been extensively
studied [I, 2, 31. While hard to TID, the high electric field
strength across the antifuse (~ 6 MeV/cm) results in a
susceptibility to heavy ion-induced failures of unprogrammed
antifuses. Fortunately for spacecraft designers, rare heavy
ions with normal LETs greater than 37 MeV-cm2/mg or VDD'S
greater than 5.5 volts are required for damage, making the
probability of failure low. The RHI280 and the Rill020 have
thicker antifuses, 99A and 96A respectively, which
dramatically reduces the failure cross-section, but increases
programming times. For example, an AI280A design which
programs in -7 minutes takes ~ 55 minutes or more for an
RHI280.
ONO
Polysilicon
FOX
Figure 1: Actel ONO Antifuse
The dielectric antifuse imposes some inherent constraints
on radiation performance. First, the relatively high voltages
required for programming limit the amount that the epitaxial
layer may be thinned. While the Manassas rad-hard foundry
builds SRAMs on 2 l.tm epi that enhances SEU performance
by reducing charge collection from a given ion, the RHI280
and RHI020 are built on 5 pm thick epi-layers. The
RHI280's heavy ion susceptibility is similar to A1280As on
10 lttm epi. Additionally, the higher voltage isolation
transistors required hurt total dose performance leading to
increased leakage currents, longer start times, and larger turn-
on transients. Investigations into the turn-on transients
implicate the limited current capability of the charge pump
and its inability to rapidly charge the isolations transistors'
gates after total dose has increased their gate leakage [4].
When the bias voltage on the isolation transistors is
insufficient, then the logic voltages reaching logic module
inputs will bias both n and p-channel transistors of the CMOS
pair and significant totem pole currents will result, creating the
transient. An additional effect is the operation,of the I/O logic
during power-up. Using a simple implementation model, it is
easy to see that the I/O modules will have garbage in and will
put garbage out. This characteristic can cause the device to
take significant time to meet its truth table and for particular
mission-critical situations may be unacceptable. Controlling
I/O modules during power up can be relatively straightforward
with a slight change in the device architecture.
2) Amorphous Silicon Metal-to-Metal (M2M) Antifieses
Amorphous silicon antifuses hold performance
advantages over the dielectric version; programmed resistance
is -25-50 ohms versus -300-500 ohms for FPGAs. For the
programmable substrate where density is not as critical, the
programmed resistance is less than 1 ohm. Figure 2 shows a
version of a metal to metal amorphous silicon antifuse used as
our technology development vehicle. Figure 3 shows a cross-
_ction of the Quicklogic design [51. With a three layer metal
process, the antifuse can be built between layers 2 and 3 on
top of the logic device and not in a channel; this drastically
cuts die size and improves speed. The amorphous silicon
antifuses are quite a bit thicker than the ONO struclures; they
range from 500A (Pico Systems) to ~1000,_ (Quicklogic).
From a radiation perspective, amorphous silicon antifuse-
based devices hold significant advantages their lower
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programming voltages permit thin 2 lain epi-layers to be used
for maximum Single Event Upset (SEU) performance.
Metal - 3 Top
Amorphous Silicon
Dielectric
Metal - 2 Bottom
Figure 2: Actel a-Silicon Antifuse 'Pancake'
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other ones. This shows the need for a careful and thorough
screening/stress test for antifuses and tight process controls for
maximum performance. Tighter screening was applied to the
Pico Systems programmable substrate for the unit tested at an
LET of 27 MeV-cm2/mg and may account for the bend in this
devices' line. As these procedures are being developed to
improve performance, tests showed the more thorough
screening increased the variability of antifuse rupture
threshold; only some of the 'weak sisters' have been
eliminated in the Pico Systems' devices.
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Figure 3: Quicklogic et-Silicon Antifuse
Amorphous silicon devices have been radiation tested.
No problems have been observed as a function of total dose
under proton exposure. However, heavy ion irradiation did
show damage to one technology development FPGA at a
nominal bias voltage of 3.3 VDC. Using a different antifuse
material and process, a metal to metal antifuse passed heavy 8 xl0e
ion irradiation up to a Linear Energy Transfer (LET) of 59
MeV-cm2/mg at a bias voltage of 4.0 VDC. The bias voltage
for failure of this 3.3 VDC structure was not reached. Our test _> 6x108
pattern for the amorphous silicon antifuse in the v
programmable substrate consisted of two arrays of biased iT.
antifuses. Room temperature leakage at normal operating .o 4x10 e
voltages (I2VDC max) is low; under irradiation, most failed __
antifuses reached our programmed current limit of 20 mA tu
while one was observed to be partially programmed.
3) Antifuse Radiation Effects
The RHI280 and the RHI020, as mentioned above, have
thicker antifuses than their commercial/military cousins. The
increased voltage margin for rupture can be seen in Figure 4,
where positive voltage margin is shown for ions with an LET
less than 37 MeV-cm2/Ing. Figure 5 summarizes these
antifuses' performance as a flmction of electric field strength.
One important result is the two points shown for the RHI020
(prototype) at an LET of 37 MeV-cm2/mg. Here, a single
antifuse broke at a substantially lower voltage than any of the
Note:
Two processes were used for this 3.3V
Process 1 failed immediately @ 3.3
process 2 dldnl fail @ 4.0
I I I I I
30 40 50 60 70
LET (MeV-cm2/mg)
Figure 4: Antifuse Breakdown Voltage vs. LET (MeV-cmZ/mg)
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Figure 5: Antifuse Breakdown E-Field Strength vs. LET (MeV-
cm_/mg)
8O
Along with an improved voltage margin, the thick ONO
antifuses provide a decreased failure cross-section. For an
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Iodine irradiation (LET-60 MeV-cm2/mg) at Vcc - 5.5 VDC
and using Ice as a figure of merit (a good first order
approximation), it is ,seen that the RH series of devices have
superior performance to that of the thinner commercial/
military parts. Figure 6 shows a current strip chart for an
A 1280A, an RH 1020 prototype, and an RH 1280.
We used two different technology development metal-to-
metal amorphous silicon antifuses designed for 3.3 VDC
FPGA applications; each of these antifuses used a different
material and recipe. One antifuse (MKJ911) had positive
margin at 4.0 volts which exceeded the maximum
specification of 3.6 VDC for the part while irradiated with
Iodine (LET - 60 MeV-cm2/mg) at normal incidence.
Another device, the KJ91 I, immediately failed at a 3.3 VDC
bias Voltage with the current quickly ramping up over 300
mA; normal dynamic current is less than 10 mA for this
device at room temperature.
400
200
100 --'--"
0 ! I i | ! I I I I
0 200X103 400x103 600x1_ 800x10 a lX10 _
Fluence (ions/cm 2)
Figure 6: Ice as Function of Iodine Ion Fluence for Devices with
Antifuses of Varying Thickness.
For the different types of antifuses, different analysis
techniques are required. Using strictly electrical
measurements, the differential IooQ technique has been
previously described [3]. Unfortunately, our technology
development devices and programmable substrates did not
permit this technique to be applied for the initial stage of the
investigation. It has been found that biased, damaged ONO
antifuses can be detected by using emission microscopy; this
permits isolation of failed structures down to a resolution of
approximately I lzm. Unfortunately, the damaged metal-to-
metal antifuses were not detectable with this technique. We
have had initial successes for both the technology
development FPGA and the programmable substrate by using
the liquid crystal technique: this utilizes the heat generating
property of a damaged, biased, antifuse. Electrical testing of
failed amorphous silicon and ONO antifuses had differing
current-voltage 'signatures.' Details and failure analysis
photographs will be included in a future paper.
Attempts to measure the heavy ion radiation hardness of
the Quicklogic amorphous silicon antifu_ failed; the device
quickly latched up. The UTMC amorphous silicon PAL
(UT22VPI0) has been tested by several groups with no
antifuse problems reported [61; a specialized test for this
device along with structures is planned in conjunction with
UTMC engineers.
EEPROM configuration memories are also u_d in certain
FPGAs in conjunction with pass transistors. The performance
of EEPROM cells has been characterized previously and it has
been shown that there is a susceptibility to heavy ions during a
write cycle, when the electric field during the high voltage
operation is strong. For EEPROM devices, the internal
architecture must be closely examined as some devices upload
the non-volatile memory into SRAM-pass transistor elements
for configurations. For devices of this class, the radiation
characteristics of SRAM-based FPGAs will also apply.
4) SRAM-Based Devices
SRAM-based devices such as those from Xilinx, Atmel,
Lucent, NSC, Altera, etc., offer the most flexibility, as in-
system/on-orbit programmability is possible. Additionally,
this class of devices offers the most power for reconfigurable
computing platforms, flexibility for changing requirements,
and potentially even correction of logic errors and recovery of
in-flight failures. Testability and verification of these features
is outside the scope of this paper. Along with the power of
SRAM-based devices, the radiation effects and impacts are the
most complex.
Like the antifuse and EEPROM-based components, it is
critical that the configuration information remains valid.
Invalid configurations may result in incorrect operation of the
device and damage to either the FPGA itself or system
resources. It has been demonstrated that loading an incorrect
configuration into a Xilinx SRAM-based FPGA can destroy
the device, and this may apply to other manufacturers. System
resources may be damaged by loss of control of tri-state
busses or by initiating critical system events. Logic can be
included on the system board to check the configuration of the
FPGA. This can be done by either by reading out its contents
or by having the FPGA compute a checksum of its contents
and comparing it to a calculated value held in a trusted
register. Study shows that verifying the state of the FPGA at
10 m sec intervals looks feasible, although that may not be fast
enough to prevent these deleterious effects for critical
applications.
As a base technology, SRAM configuration memories
have significant advantages over other technologies.
However, there are significant architectural disadvantages. It
is not possible to utilize structures such as Triple Modular
Redundancy (TMR) or Hamming codes for existing devices to
mitigate SEU's, as can be done with FPGA user memory.
Additionally, quite a large number of cells need to be made
SEU-hard. Table 1 shows the number of configuration
memory elements required for different FPGA architectures,
with I0,000 "usable gate array gates" as the standard size.
Note that for FPGA architectures with limited routing
resources, the number of usable gates can vary dramatically.
While it is noted that the antifuse based device does have
configuration memory bits (for programming and testing
applications) they are held in reset via an external pin so they
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don't contribute to the radiation .sensitivity of the device. The
amount of silicon required for configuration memory for
SRAM-based FPGAs is similar in principle to a moderately
large sized radiation-hardened SRAM. In addition to the
storage, pass transistors, routing resources, logic needs to be
implemented on the die. The sheer number of configuration
bits, relative to the number of user storage elements, directly
increases the cross-section of the device by roughly two orders
of magnitude.
Table 1. SRAM Configuration Memory Sizes
FPGA Configuration Memory (Bits)
AT6010 131,000
XC4020 329,000
XC6216 173,000
2C26 274,000
The effects of an upset in an SRAM-based FPGA strongly
depend on the technology, architectural features, and system
design. For instance, a SEU may cause two output drivers
internal to the chip to be connected, resulting in an
unintentional high-current state which may exceed current
density requirements for reliable operation. Other problems
may be bus fights on internal tri-state busses leading to
overstress, isolation of pull-up resistors on tri-state busses
resulting in floating inputs and oscillations, changing of output
slew rates resulting in system timing failures, change of input % 10r
delays resulting in timing failures or metastable states, turning ._
input modules into an output configuration, leading to 10"
overstress or failure of the FPGA and/or other components on _.
the board, logic failures resulting in failure of the system g
board causing either a detected safe-hold and reconfiguration _ 10"
or permanent damage or state change if used in critical
circuits, etc. _ 10-_o
45
40,
35
3O , , , ,
0 20x108 40x108 60x106 80x10e
Fluence(ions/cm2)
Vcc= 4.7VDC;LET= 53;Angle=0 Degrees
100x10e
Heavy ion testing of Xilinx, Lucent, and Atmel SRAM-
based FPGAs show configuration memory upsets with an
extremel2y low upset LET threshold of approximately 4-5
MeV-cm/mg. Additionally, some devices are up_t in
configuration memory with 200 MeV protons. Also observed
were step increases in supply currents similar, but larger than
those seen with antifuse failure in ONO antifuse based
FPGAs. The extra current could be removed by reconfiguring
the device, without a power reset, with the most probable
cause being an internal driver fight, as seen in antifuse
FPGAs. Figures 7 shows an lcc strip chart during heavy ion
irradiation of an ONO antifuse-based device (RHI280) with
an SRAM-based device showing a similar signature, most
likely a similar effect of a short in the routing structure.
Figure 8 shows that a cross-section vs. LET curve can be
constructed for the configuration memory elements for Single
Event Reprogramming (SER). This particular curve serves as
a lower bound for the device; a 'failure' was detected by
functional failure of a simple shift-register circuit where
functionality can be immune to a large number of
configuration upsets. Future instrumentation of this class of
devices will directly verify the configuration memory's
contents, providing increased accuracy in the measurement.
10-6
Figure 7: RH 1280 Antifuse Rupture 'Signature'
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Figure 8: Single Event Reprogramming for SRAM FPGA
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5) Quick-Turn ASICS
Quick turn ASICs are immune to configuration memory
errors as their configuration is 'programmed' with metal.
B. FABRICATION CONSIDERATIONS
A variety of basic technologies is utilized for the
fabrication of FPGAs. Commercial FPGAs are made from
both bulk and epitaxial silicon CMOS processes. An
interesting device under development (US Air Force) is a re-
programmable GaAs-ba_d FPGA. Two methods are in
general use for making user-accessible storage elements:
dedicated flip-flops and latches which have low impedance
feedback connections and storage elements constructed from
logic gates (i.e., multiplexors with feedback) which utilize the
routing array for feedback connections.
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I) Latchup Susceptibility and Analysis
Bulk CMOS FPGAs from Quicklogic, Atmel, Lucent,
GateField, and Xilinx show low latchup thresholds that are
summarized in Table 2. However, the Chip Express QYH580,
which is a bulk device, performed well with regards to
latchup. It has a threshold of ~ 60 MeV-cm2/mg at Voo -
5.5VDC; at VDD -- 3.6 VDC no latchup was detected up to an
LET of 74 MeV-cm2/mg. The results for this device are
shown in Figure 9.
10-4
lO-S
AE
o 10-6
6-
c
o_ 10 .7
•_ 10-82
10-9
10-10
• Vcc- 3.3V
[] •Vcc=3.6V
• Vcc=5.0V
V Vcc=5.5V
V
A¢_, _._, ,
20 40 60 80 1O0
LET (MeV--cm2/mg)
Figure 9: Latchup Performance of Bulk QYH580
Table 2. Summary of FPGA Latchup Performance
Latched Threshold Not Latched
A 1020B/TI -22 RH 1020
A 1020B/MEC 27-37 A 1280XL
A32200DX 11 - 16 A32140DX
AT6002 ~11 1460A, 14100A
QYH580 (5.5)
CX204I (5.5)
GFI0009K
.-.60
~22
<12
QYH580 (3.6)
CLAy-31
KJ911
2C40 <7.8 MKJ9 ! 1
pASIC 1 <<60
XC3090 4-7
Epitaxial CMOS devices performed better, most showing
no sign of latchup, although as previously seen in memory
chips and processors, epi is no guarantee of latchup-
immunity. Shrinking feature sizes can make a device more
latchup susceptible as seen in Matsushita Electric Company
(MEC) foundry AI020's on 10 I.tm epi. 1.0 lam A1020B's
latched at an LETTH of ~ 55 MeV-cm2/mg, although the 2.0
I.tm A I020 and the 1.2 I.tm A IO20A did not latch to an LET of
greater thanl20. Neither the MEC 1.0 I.tm AI280A's nor !.2
pm A I280's latched and were designed with different design
rules. Also, the foundry can make a critical difference as seen
from comparing i.0 lttm AI020B's from MEC and TI, along
with a 1.0 !am RHI020 prototype, tested under identical
conditions. The RHI020 would not latch, the MEC AI020B
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latched with a small cross-_ction, and the TI A IO20B latched
with a cross-section greater than an order or magnitude larger
than the MEC device. Additional testing showed that the TI
produced devices had a latchup threshold of ~ 22 MeV-
cm2/mg. Further tests showed that recently produced MEC
AI020B's had a latchup threshold between 27 and 37 MeV-
cm2/mg, considerably less than the devices tested three years
earlier. MEC and TI 1.0 ILtm AI020B's were subjected to
destructive physical analysis (DPA) and showed near identical
epi-layer thickness, with the MEC part having a 9 I.tm epi-
layer and the TI device having the nominal 10 I.tm layer.
Another example of epi parts latching is shown in Figure
10 for the new A3200DX family, which is derived from the
familiar Act 2 devices and are produced on a 0.6 I.tm epitaxial
process from the Chartered foundry. Two lots of A32200DX
were tested and both lots readily latched. However, its sister
part, the A32140DX did not latch at all. Destructive physical
analysis was performed on the latched parts and showed good
epi-layer thickness, between 8.5 and 9.0 I.tm, within
specification. The major architectural difference between the
A32200DX and the A32140DX is on-chip SRAM in the
A32200DX; a detailed examination of this area of the chip
showed a lack of guard rings, which contribute to the chip's
latchup sensitivity.
10-4
_" 10-5
0
¢-
._o 10 _
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¢_ I0 r
10-s
0
_40DX
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J
,,,,, .... ,,,,,, .... , .... , .... l .... l .... I
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
LET (MeV-cm2/mg)
Figure I0: Latchup Performance of Epi A3200DX Family
2) Total Dose Capability and Analysis
Many of the FPGA companies are 'fabless' and some
have multiple sources for their devices. As seen above with
respect to latchup, similar dependencies have been observed
for total dose. Several years ago the differences between TI
and MEC parts for the AI020 were measured, with the MEC
parts able to survive greater than 100 krads (Si) and the
capability of the TI devices were less than 10 krads (Si).
Recently, testing has been conducted with the newer Act 3
devices, the AI460A, and the AI410OA. Here, parts from
MEC have been able to withstand between 15 and 50 krads
(Si), depending on the lot, and die produced at Chartered
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failed at approximately 4 krads (Si) or less. Sample data is
shown in Figure I 1.
Additionally, manufacturers continually update their
designs and continue to shrink the process used for
fabrication, sometimes concurrently, making it difficult to
,separate the causes of changing radiation characteristics. For
instance, the 1.2 and 1.0 p.m A I280(A) devices have migrated
to the AI280XL family, fabricated in 0.8 and 0.6 pm feature
sizes, with production moved to Winbond and Chartered.
While AI280A devices are typically 'good' (Ice less than 6
mA) to approximately 6-7 krads (Si), TID testing showed
inferior performance of the XL series devices, with a
capability of 4 krads (Si) or less. Figure 12 shows the
performance of the AI280XL with 196 MeV protons; these
devices failed at less than 3 krads (Si).
1000
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_o
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1°/
1 .....
o
AI4;00A Wlnbond S/N 001, 0(_
Right Lol
.... i ......... , ..........................
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kRads(Si)
Figure l I: TID Performance as a Function of Foundry
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g; ,o
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kRads (Si)
development device has shown a tolal dose capability of
between 30 and 50 kraals (Si), fabricated at MEC. One lot's
performance was characterized with protons and another lot in
the NASA/GSFC Cobalt-60 facilily (Figure 14, the MKJ911
device). Also shown in Figure 14 is a technology
development vehicle processed at Lockheed-Martin (K J91 I);
testing was completed until the dose reached 200 krads (Si),
with no observed parametric changes in Ice and the part
passed functional tests.
lOOO
lOO
lO
<
E
O
O
//
HitPowerSupl_yTripPoint
i i , , I i , , _ I i _ i l
0 1 2 3
kRads (Si)
Figure 13:A32140DX (Chartered) "liD Performance
Observed total dose performance is summarized in Table 3.
Table 3. Recent TID Measurements
o
Device
A 1280A
AI280XL
Size (Foundry) kRads (Si)
1.0 p.m (MEC) -7
0.8 pun(WIN) < 3
RHI280 0.8 _ (L-M) > 300
A I280XL 0.6 [.un(CH) < 3
Act 3 0.8 gm (MEC) 15-50+
Act 3 0.8 pm (WIN) < 5
A32140DX < 3
MKJ911
KJ911
QYH580
CX2041
0.6 _ (CH)
0.6 [.un(MEC) 30-50
0.6 _ (L-M) > 200
0.8 pm (Yamaha) -15
0.6 pm (Tower) -7- I0
Several studies were performed to determine the affect of
design and process on total dose capability of commercial
parts and gain additional insight into the devices' total dose
limitation. These studies are continuing and will be reported
in a future paper.
Figure 12: TID Performance of A I280XL Series
The newer 0.6 _tm Chartered produced A32140DX had a
total dose capability of approximately 2.2 krads (Si). The data
is shown in Figure 13. However, a 0.6 p.m technology
3) Proton Susceptibility and Analysis
For many low earth orbiting satellites, sensitivity to
protons is a major system design issue. Table 4 summarizes
measured and expected proton results. It appears that device
scaling is a major indicator of proton susceptibility, with most
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devices less than 1.0 jim in feature size being susceptible to
proton upset. For example, the A I280A (I.0 jim, TI and
MEC) would not upset for 200 MeV protons; the 0.8 and 0.6
l.tm A I280XL's as well as 0.8 jim Act 3 devices would upset
(for hard-wired flip-flops). Additionally, it should be noted
that an upset was observed in the Act 3 I/O flip-flop.
1O0
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<
g
0
0
0.1
7,
• K,Jgll 1¢¢(5.0) _F_
O KJOl ! IOC (3.3) jr ¥
• M_9,, =(slo) r _¢
10 100
kRads (Si)
Figure 14: Icc vs. Dose for Two 0.6 pm Development Parts.
Table 4. Summary of 196 MeV Proton Tests
Proton SEU Susceptibility
Upset No Upset
AI280XL C, I/OA 1280XL (0.6, 0.8)
RH 1280 S (0.8) RH1280 C, I/O
Act 3 S, I/O (0.8 p.m) AI280 (1.2 gin)
CLAy-3I (0.8 gin) AI280A (I.0 pm)
AT6002 (data)(0.8 pm) Act 3 C
MKJ911 (0.6 p.m)
However, feature size is just one contributing factor. As
seen in Table 4, a 0.6 I.tm device used for technology
development, the MKJ911 saw no proton upsets, with the
hard-wired flip-flops corresponding to S-Modules bia_d at
only 3.3 VDC. Further analysis shows that flip-flop design
and construction directly affect the SEU performance. Over a
variety of technologies, 'hard-wired' flip-flops have shown
LET thresholds between 4 and 10 MeV-cm2/mg; those
constructed from logic gates have been measured to have
thresholds of approximately 15-25 MeV-cm2/mg. Hard-wired
flip-flops are constructed with metal connections at device
fabrication time; those constructed from gates differ in that the
feedback signals propagate through the routing network where
routing tracks have relatively high capacitances. These
numbers have held relatively constant, even for designs that
have been scaled from 2.0 jim down to 1.0 jim, such as the
MEC AI020 series. For many devices, a strong relationship
has been noted between stored state and flip-flop sensitivity.
TNS/NSREC 1997
Analysis has shown that this is a design that has been
optimized for commercial, non-radiation-hardened
applications. Prototype devices with circuit designs more
amenable to space flight applications have shown dramatic
improvements in SEU performance. As shown in Figure 15,
the performance of the A I280A varies widely, depending on
stored state; these curves are for a Vcc - 5.0VDC. The TD
device, operating at Vcc - 3.0VDC, has superior performance
to the "non-balanced" version. A similar effect can be seen
with a 'routed' flip-flop design. Figure 16 shows A1280A
performance and the effect of state; also plotted is the
QYH580 that is constructed with connections going through
the routing network in the channeled architecture and the flip-
flop is a balanced, symmetrical design. Here, the 0.8 pm
QYH580 performance matches the 'best case' performance of
the 1.0 I.tm A 1280A.
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I / .-B- A12SOA"S'S_ _0'II,S.OV
__J J NOTE: IE-8 Dqmol-a No Up.e!10-e ,-- , - i l , i i
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Figure 15:SEU Perfvs. F-F Design for Hardwired F-F's
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Figure 16: SEU Perf. vs. F-F Design for Routed F-F's
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Several other factors influence flip-flop performance.
Our technology development vehicle was fabricated both on
I0 l_m and 2 l.tm epi substrates. While initial simulations
indicated that there would be little to no gain at a Vcc of 3.0
VDC, performance measurements showed a consistent benefit
to the 2 i_m epi device. Another factor is the trend to lower
supply voltages. As the density and operating speed of
devices continues to increase, power dissipation will become a
limiting factor for many designs. Consequently, designers are
moving to lower voltages, typically Vcc- 3.3VDC since
power is a function of the square of the operating voltage.
Figure 17 shows the SEll performance change for the
QYH580. Note for this device, the SEU threshold is still
approximately 28 MeV-cm2/mg at Vcc-3.3 volts, acceptable
for many applications without having to resort to techniques
such as triple modular redundancy (TMR) [I, 7].
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Figure I 7: SEU Performance vs. Vcc For the QYH580
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4) Logic Upset
Logic upset is defined as a transient pulse from a single
ion strike. This can occur in combinational circuits or the
output of a flip-flop that doesn't change state (which would
make it an SEU). Logic upset has been observed in some
FPGAs. This includes clock upset in the 2.0 I.tm Ai020 at
standard operating voltages and gate hits in the RH! 280 when
running at a supply voltage of 3.3 VDC + 10%. The future
direction of FPGAs is towards lower supply voltages that are
required by the advanced 0.35 and 0.25 I.tm processes in the
commercial world. Xilinx commercial product plans, for
instance, call for core logic voltages falling below the 3.3
VDC level, dropping to 2.5 VDC [8]. While necessary from a
processing point of view, system designers will insist on lower
voltages. With higher operating frequencies and gate counts,
reducing the operating voltage is critical since the power is a
function of the square of the voltage and a linear function of
frequency. To date, detecting logic upset has relied on
cumbersome techniques such as monitoring clock frequency,
observing changes in SEU rate as a function of frequency (to
catch glitches), etc. Recently, new on-chip circuits have been
designed to directly detect logic upset since bringing a small
'glitch' off-chip will be difficult since it can be filtered by the
output stage. Since storage is required for this measurement,
self-relative techniques are used to cancel out the SEU rate of
the monitors.
C. ARCHITECTURAL FEATURES
Architectural features factor into the radiation
susceptibility of FPGAs. For instance, power-on re_t circuits
may be upset and alter the state of a reconfigurable device.
This has been observed in radiation-hardened PALs (by
Boeing) with the function of the reset in the 22V10
architecture resulting in all flip-flops being cleared [6].
Obviously, this has serious implications for SRAM-based gate
arrays used in critical applications. At the circuit level, the
state of the device can be altered such that the reloading
sequence needs to be repeated; other effects include altering
the function and structure of the device which is discussed
below. Error monitoring circuits may be needed to ensure
adequate system reliability by constantly monitoring the
configuration; these trusted circuits will obviously consume
valuable board space unless provision is made for including
radiation-hardened monitors on the FPGA device. This may
be preferable to SEU-hardening 150,000 or more
configuration bits for some applications. The architecture of
the device and system design also affects these error-checking
operations. For instance, some devices contain a mode where
'reading' the configuration bits produces a checksum. This
mode will be useful for FPGAs that are loaded from a remote
processor where constantly shipping the PROM contents will
consume excessive processor and I/O bandwith. Another
approach would be for the trusted monitor t_ 'listen' as the
FPGA device is being loaded, read out the FPGA's
configuration bits, compute the checksum locally, and then
compare it to the checksum of the loaded pattern. Note that
for FPGAs that are configured in a daisy-chain manner, which
simplifies external I/O, the situation is a bit more complicated.
Lastly, in the event that an FPGA needs to be reloaded in a
critical system, erroneous outputs need to be blocked to not
have a negative system impact and the system must be
restarted. This would require that all outputs be delayed by
trusted circuits by the amount of time necessary to verify the
FPGA's configuration and then replace the FPGAs outputs
with 'safe' values in the event of a fault. Obviously, this
complicates gate array logic design as well as system design
and operations.
At the circuit level, there are strong impacts from an SEU
in the configuration memories of SRAM-based FPGAs. For
some examples, the I/O cell of a popular SRAM-based FPGA
(XC4000) is reproduced in Figure 18 19]. Key functional
attributes of the device are controlled by SRAM. These
include pull-up and pull-down resistors, input threshold, input
and output clock polarities, input delay, output polarity,
whether I/O is pass-through or registered, and whether the cell
is an input or an output. System level effects can range from a
slight power increase (e.g., enabling a pull-up resistor) to
Page 9 of 12
PREPRINT- IEEE TNS/NSREC 1997
intermittent operation (e.g., changing input delay), to incorrect
results (e.g., changing output polarity), to system damage
(e.g., enabling a tri-state buffer for a cell that is required to
serve as a high-impedance input). Internally to the device, for
some architectures, configuration SRAM upsets can result in
driver fights in the routing network, bus fights on tri-state
busses, floating busses if a pull-up resistor is disconnected,
etc. These SEU's can potentially result in compromising the
reliability of the hardware from device overstress.
OE
Out
Output
Clock
In
!
!
!
I
I
I
I2 I
Input
Clock i •
Figure 18:XC4000 Series FO Block
For the first several generations of FPGAs, there has been
a trend to both increase the number of I/O pins and the
functionality and performance of the I/O modules. For
example, the popular Act 1 family had an I/O module that
consisted simply of an input buffer and a tri-state output. For
Act 2 two latches were added and they had moderate SEU
hardness with an LETTH of- 25 MeV-cm2/mg. Higher circuit
performance and functionality was realized in the Act 3 I/O
module. This was a result of the two registers that permit
higher speed pin-to-pin operation. It also results in a larger
I/O module and as a result, the p-channel feedback transistor
in the flip-flop structure in this commercial/military design
was minimized. This results in a SEU LETTH of ~ 10 MeV-
cm2/mg and susceptibility to proton upset. While the register-
rich FPGAs easily permit TMR schemes to combat SEU's,
implementing this at the I/O module is prohibitively expensive
since the basic rule in FPGA design are that gates are cheap
and I/O pins are expensive. While FPGA manufacturers have
addressed this issue with increasing I/O counts from ~60 pins
per chip to greater than 200, the scaling of logic cell density
and the move from 8 and 16-bit systems to 32-bit systems
keeps I/O pin usage at a premium. A radiation-hardened
architecture would either harden the storage elements in the
I/O cells or have architectures that feature 0 nS hold time for
internal storage elements with respect to the device's pins and
fast clock to out for small off-chip delays. These parameters,
in particular, are critical for PCI applications, which are
becoming more prevalent in space-based designs.
Recently, the XC6200 family was introduced for
reconfigurable computing applications. An examination of the
data sheet reveals some interesting architectural features for
design engineers [10]. However, the XC6200 has a register to
globally control some device characteristics. One key
function is a clock on/off bit with obvious implications for
critical systems in the radiation environment.
IEEE 1149.1 JTAG (Joint Test Action Group) circuitry is
included on recent FPGAs. This includes a state machine
called the Test Access Port (TAP) controller to command the
chip into either an operational or one of several test modes
(i.e., controlling the direction and state of the I/O). This
machine may be susceptible to SEU's and are strongly
suspected to have been detected during heavy ion testing.
Some test modes, if not commanded at the board level since it
is a system test, may damage the FPGA or other system
devices as well as causing a loss of control. For example, the
EXTEST command can configure all I/O pins as outputs,
actively driving; the actual function of each pin is determined
by a two-bit per pin shift register which is part of the test
logic. 1149.1 includes a provision for a hard reset for the TAP
controller which could ensure that test modes are not entered;
unfortunately, most FPGA manufacturers are not
implementing this function. For antifuse devices, some
models have the ability to hardwire the TAP controller into
the reset state. Of course, this eliminates the testability
features that will become more important as FPGAs are
integrated into MCM and Chip On Board (COB) assemblies.
IV. FLIGHT VS. GROUND DATA
Programmable devices have been extensively studied in
ground radiation facilities and are virtually ubiquitous on
modern, space-flight circuit card assemblies. One part of our
study is a board that was designed and built to fly on the
Microelectronics/Photonics Test Bed (MPTB). See Figure 19
for a simplified block diagram. This card will perform SEU,
total dose, and antifuse rupture experiments. Total dose
damage will be studied by monitoring the _:urrent to each
device under test (DUT), including the control DUT. Also,
shields of varying thickness' and materials are used on a
subset of the DUTs and a dosimeter is placed on the card.
SEU's will be monitored by examining the contents of the
DUTs memory elements, configured as shift registers. S-
Module, C-Module, and l/O-Module flip-flops are monitored.
On board logic can generate several different test patterns or
the chip may be placed into any arbitrary state by the system
processor; note that this can be potentially used to perform in-
flight looQ measurements. The DUTs used for the SEU
measurements are 5 A I460A's (0.8 I.tm) produced at the MEC
foundry. Three of the DUTs are connected to an in-flight
programmable voltage rail that permits devices to be operated
at either 3.3VDC or 5.0VDC. For an antifuse rupture
experiment, a programmable bias generator and a fine current
sensor are connected to an A I280A/KFUSE (1.0 lain). The
double-sided board is shown in Figures 20 and 2 I.
V. Conclusion
FPGAs will become increasing crilical in spacecraft
electronics designs as the emphasis to decrease cost and
mission development time continues. These same factors are
also driving the use of other technologies such as
programmable substrates aml quick-lurn ASICs. There is a
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strong drive to utilize staml,lrd ('()T,_/military devices in
spacellight systems to minindze cost and dcvch_pment time as
compared with radiation-hardened devices. This has serious
in]pacts on the radialion and system performance for
spaceflight systems.
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Figure 20: Side A of the MPTB Experiment.
While it is desirable to find trends such as those based on
process scaling, no generalizations can be made. Instead. it is
seen lhal there is a complex interplay of scaling vs, process vs.
system w)ltage vs, architecture vs. circuit desi_gn. M:my rules
of thumb fail and detailed examination, analysis, and testing is
required. New. modern architectural features II1;.11 permit
flexibility for commercial systems can have severe radiation
implications. This can require athlitinn:d _y'_tem resources
such as monilnrs, protection of circuits" O|ltr:,uls,. ;lud system
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restart/checkl'Poinl capabilily along wilh risk _f danmgc Io the
hardware or sy,ctem from the new failure nlodc,:, introduced.
Many COTS slrtncturcs are exlrcmely reli:Lblc for ground
operations. I lowcvcr, many types of failures from radiation
have been dctecled in struclures such as configuration
memories. ON() antifuses, anti nlelal-to-melal anti fuses from
several manufacturers. The susceptibility of the relatively
thick, low electric field slrenglh amorphous silicon antifuse
was not expcclcd and demonstrales the susceptibility of COTS
structures in the radiation environment. Additionally,
improvements in antifuse reliability were made: the ONO
antifuse in the Rtt1020 and RIII2gO is improved and one
metal-to-metal antifuse has so far demonstrated immunity to
damage from heavy ions. It has been identified that the
screening/stress procedures for antifinse test are critical for
eliminating the weak sisters and ensuring adequate reliability.
'Qualification by similarity' must be approached with caution
as the introduction of a single architectural feature has been
seen to inject a major radiation hazard. Examples have been
seen where identical devices produced at different foundries
have widely different radiation characteristics. Lastly, the
architectures, structures, circuits, designs, scaling, and
processes are constantly changing; test methods and
equipment must be updated as well to accurately measure the
radiation affects on these devices.
Figure 21: Skle B of Ihe MPTB Experiment,
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VIII. Appendix I
Summary of Devices
Actel FPGA
Actel FPGA
Actel FPGA
Actel FPGA
Actel FPGA
Actel FPGA
Actel FPGA
Actel FPGA AI460A, AI4100A
Actel FPGA A32140DX, A32200DX
Atmel FPGA
Atmel FPGA
Chip LPGA, One-Mask AS1C
Express
Chip LPGA, One-Mask ASIC
Express
Gate Field FPGA
Lucent FPGA
Lucent FPGA
National FPGA
Picosystems Programmable Substrate
Quicklogic FPGA
UTMC PAL
Xilinx FPGA
Xilinx FPGA
Xilinx FPGA
MKJ91 I, KJ911 Technology
Development
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